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企业研发决策与政府补贴模式——“承诺与背叛”情景下的演化博弈分析

R&D Strategy of Enterprises and Governmental Subsidy Model——“Commitment and Betrayal” Simulation Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Model
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摘要 本文在'承诺维系下的合作'与'背叛发生时的竞争'两种策略约束下,考察了企业参与产学协同研发的策略演化过程,并比较了政府补贴模式的差异性激励效应,研究结论表明,在'承诺维系下的合作'情景下,事前补贴与事后补贴的政府激励模式不存在激励效应差异,此时,补贴强度若达到企业策略转换触发阈值,将有效增强产学协同研发的政策激励效应。但在'背叛发生时的竞争'情景下,奖励性事后补贴模式存在扭曲激励效应,此时,事前补贴才是更优的政府激励策略。 This paper analysis the evolutionary process of enterprises R&D participating in industry-academy alliance under the situation of'cooperation under commitment maintained'and'competition when betrayal occurs',and compares the differential incentive effects of the government subsidy model.The results show that:under the situation of'cooperation under commitment maintained',there is no incentive effect difference between the government incentive model of Beforehand-subsidy and Afterwards-subsidy.In this case,if the subsidy strength reaches the trigger threshold of corporate policy conversion,it will effectively enhance the policy incentive effect.But in the situation of'competition when Betrayal occurs',the Afterwards-subsidy model has a distorting incentive effect.The Beforehand-subsidy subsidy is a better government incentive strategy.
作者 罗晓辉 胡珑瑛 万丛颖 Xiao-hui LUO;Long-ying HU;Cong-ying WAN(School of Management of Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150001,China;Dongbei University of Finance and Economics Economic and Social Development Research Institute,Dalian 116025,China)
出处 《产业组织评论》 CSSCI 2018年第3期20-35,共16页 Industrial Organization Review
基金 国家软科学研究计划(2010GXS5D199) 国家社会科学基金项目(15CJY045)
关键词 产学联盟 演化博弈 承诺与背叛 Industry-Academy Alliance Evolutionary game Commitment and betrayal
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