企业研发决策与政府补贴模式——“承诺与背叛”情景下的演化博弈分析

R&D Strategy of Enterprises and Governmental Subsidy Model——“Commitment and Betrayal” Simulation Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Model

本文在'承诺维系下的合作'与'背叛发生时的竞争'两种策略约束下,考察了企业参与产学协同研发的策略演化过程,并比较了政府补贴模式的差异性激励效应,研究结论表明,在'承诺维系下的合作'情景下,事前补贴与事后补贴的政府激励模式不存在激励效应差异,此时,补贴强度若达到企业策略转换触发阈值,将有效增强产学协同研发的政策激励效应。但在'背叛发生时的竞争'情景下,奖励性事后补贴模式存在扭曲激励效应,此时,事前补贴才是更优的政府激励策略。

This paper analysis the evolutionary process of enterprises R&D participating in industry-academy alliance under the situation of'cooperation under commitment maintained'and'competition when betrayal occurs',and compares the differential incentive effects of the government subsidy model.The results show that:under the situation of'cooperation under commitment maintained',there is no incentive effect difference between the government incentive model of Beforehand-subsidy and Afterwards-subsidy.In this case,if the subsidy strength reaches the trigger threshold of corporate policy conversion,it will effectively enhance the policy incentive effect.But in the situation of'competition when Betrayal occurs',the Afterwards-subsidy model has a distorting incentive effect.The Beforehand-subsidy subsidy is a better government incentive strategy.