摘要
在农村经济改革中复苏的家族,借助村民直选的制度渠道成为影响农村权力结构的社会因素。本文通过案例分析与比较,揭示了家族结构(房族结构)对村庄的权力配置的均衡作用,以及农村资源的重新配置、村民选举的实际结果对党支部、村委会与家族关系格局的深刻影响。具体地说,在“党强村强”的村庄,家族一般能够与村支两委结成良性互动关系;在“党强村弱”的村庄,党支部在控制村委会的同时也控制了家族社会资本;在“村强党弱”的村庄,恰恰是党支部不能从家族关系中提取社会资源,而村委会获得了这种社会资本,从而能够扮演村民利益看护人的角色;至于“党弱村弱”的村庄,既有可能出现家族暴政,也有可能出现三者共弱的局面。
This paper studies the powerful presence of clan element in China' s rural ar-eas. Different cases show that clan leadership grows where party leadership declines. The clan influences village elections and takes a share in the dual power structure of party committee and village committee. In the villages where party committee and village committee are strong, the power of clan is under control. However, in the villages where both committees are weak, either clan tyranny emerges, or there is no strong leadership at all.
出处
《开放时代》
2002年第3期95-106,共12页
Open Times
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究"十五"规划第一批研究项目<中国农村权力结构研究>(项目批准号:01JA810010)的阶段性成果。