一类供应商逆向选择问题的报酬机制研究

Study on the Payment Mechanism of Suppliers' Adverse Selection

研究了采购企业在缺乏供应商实际业务能力、服务成本等方面信息的情况下 ,利用博弈论显示原理设计不同的供货合同来让供应商选择 ,从而根据供应商的选择结果来判断其真实的能力或类型 ,从而避免了供应商逆向选择问题的发生 .通过分析 ,得出了最优报酬机制的特征 ,并证明了上述报酬机制下的最优合同与采购企业对供应商综合能力和成本的先验认识无关 .

In this paper, we use Revelation Principle to design a set of contracts to let supplier select, and get the true information about supplier according to their selecting result, under the circumstance that the information of the capability and the cost of suppliers are not available to the buyer side. Through analysis, we get the characteristics of optimal payment mechanism and prove that the proposed payment mechanism is independent of ex\|ante beliefs,which the buyer has on the capability and the cost of the supplier.