关于建立国有企业经营者群体动态股权激励机制的思考

On the Dynamic Share - holding Incentive to Top Managers of SOEs

权力制衡与经营者激励机制是构建国有企业治理机制应解决的两个基本问题。经营者持股方案作为一种长期激励机制倍受推崇,并被广泛应用。但是,如果缺乏相应的约束机制,将产生道德风险。本文综合运用虚拟股权激励与期权激励的原理设计经营者群体动态股权激励机制及相应的风险抵押机制。本方案的特点是设计预留股通过内部模拟市场交易对分配股进行调节,防范本届经营班子的短期行为。

Power balanced and incentive to CEO are two basic problems in the design of governance structure to sate owned enterprisas. As one of the most efficient long - term incentive contract, share holding plan has been wildly used to provide incentives to top managers . However, the problem of moral hazard would occur on the absence of limited conditions. In order to regain the efficiency of stock holding incentive, the basic ideals of phantom stocks and stock option are applied to design incentive mechanism of dynamic share- holding plan. In this paper. One of the important characters of the dynamic share- holding plan lies in a pooling which provides a channel for the share holder to sell her holding stocks via the internal transaction of stock. Market.