信誉腐败和信息流通

Reputation Corruption and Information Circulation

信誉的腐败是我国商品经济过渡时期中存在的一个普遍问题,在商品交易中各种欺诈行为比比皆是,其严重性危害了有效市场体制的建立。从经济学角度分析,在单次双方博弈中,由于存在信息的不对称,各方都有进行商业欺诈的积极性。重复博弈虽能有效的解决这个悖论,但是在市场中,重复博弈的基础是信息的有效流通。缺乏这种基础,重复博弈无法采取“触发战略”(triger strategy),而只是单次博弈的简单重复,信誉腐败问题仍然不能得到解决,因此建立畅通的信息流通体制是恢复我国市场信誉的重要途径。

Reputation corruption is a common problem during the transition times of Chinese Commodity Economy, while its ponderance jeopardizes the development of effective market system. In view of economics, due to the information asymmetry in the single static game, both sides will have the intention to cheat. Though repeated game will effectively resolve this dilemma, the ground of it in the real market is based on the expedite information circulation, otherwise the repeated game will be no more than the simple repeat of single game for it cannot take the trigger strategy. So to establish an efficient way of information circulation is an important method to reconstruct the market reputation of our country.