摘要
知识交易过程存在着交易双方信息不对称的现象,卖方向买方披露信息消除这一信息不对称,会引发买方的“搭便车”行为。一方面,买方的“搭便车”行为受自身因素制约;另一方面,卖方通过销售制度的设计,可以减少买方的“搭便车”行为;买卖双方相互博弈的结果,导致了知识产品价格的上涨。
An asymmetry of information exists between bargaining parties in knowledge transaction. Sellers may reveal relevant infor-mation to buyers, which will eliminate the asymmetry but induce free riding. While buyers' behavior is subjected to its own factors, sellers can reduce free riding through designation of distribution systems. All the interactions will result in a continuous price increase for knowledge goods.
出处
《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2001年第5期125-133,共9页
Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences