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拍卖经济理论综述 被引量:73

An Overview of Auction Theory
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摘要 近 2 0年来 ,拍卖理论已经迅速发展成为经济学中最成功也最活跃的重要分支之一。在国内 ,政府与私人部门正与日俱增地通过拍卖机制采购或销售商品与权利。但拍卖从业界和经济学界对拍卖理论仍然相当陌生。为此 ,本文以基准拍卖模型和收入等价定理为起点 ,紧密围绕拍卖机制的绩效比较与最优拍卖机制设计问题 ,系统地介绍了近半个世纪以来国际拍卖理论的主要进展 ,同时展望其未来的发展轮廓并对这一前沿理论予以简要评述。 In Last twenty years, auction theory has been among the most successful branches of economics. As a result,great theoretical, practical and empirical importance has been attached to it. In China, the government and private sectors are increasingly applying auction mechanism to selling or purchasing items. However, domestic practitioners and economists are still quite unfamiliar with the core of this field. In this paper, starting with the benchmark model and revenue equivalence theorem, I present the major progress in auction theory and outline its prospect. This survey centers round the performance of various auction mechanisms and optimal mechanism design. Finally, brief remarks are made on this frontier.
作者 许永国
出处 《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2002年第9期84-91,共8页 Economic Research Journal
基金 同济大学中德学院德国科学基金联合会教研室资助
关键词 拍卖经济理论 拍卖 信息非对称 绩效 机制设计 多物品拍卖 Auction Information asymmetry Performance Mechanism design Multi-unit auction
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