会计选择与证券审核监管

Accounting Choices and Securities Regulation

本文在简要回顾会计选择的三种理论解释的基础上,以交易成本理论作为分析工具,通过引入监管能力和监管问责激励,讨论证券审核监管如何型塑会计选择。文章主要观点是,当监管能力和监管问责激励缺乏时,会计选择的空间较大,会计数字的质量不高。而当监管问责激励增强时,会计选择的空间将变小,可观察的会计选择将更加强调外部可验证性和会计稳健性。

The paper reviews briefly three theoretical explanations for accounting choice. Then I use a transaction cost framework,to which I introduce regulatory capacity and regulatory accountability,to discuss how regulations in securities audit and approval shape the accounting choice. My main arguments are as follow:when both regulatory capacity and regulatory accountability are restricted,there appears to be ample room for accounting choice and thus inferior accounting quality. When regulatory accountability is enforced, the room for accounting choice will be reduced and the observable accounting choices will conform to accounting verifiability and conservatism.