考虑存在欺骗行为的二级物流服务供应链决策博弈研究

Research on the Two-Echelon Logistics Service Supply Chain Decision Game Considering the Existence of Deception

考虑单物流服务平台商和单物流服务提供商组成的二级物流服务供应链,分别探讨了物流服务提供商不存在欺骗行为和存在欺骗行为时的决策博弈,以及各参数对博弈的影响。在此基础上,进一步分析了物流服务平台商与物流服务提供商在集中化决策、分散化决策、物流服务提供商存在欺骗行为三种情况下的选择偏好。研究发现,物流服务平台商在集中化决策下能获得最大利润,物流服务提供商在分散化决策下能获得最大利润,物流服务平台商允许物流服务提供商的欺骗行为在一定意义上是有益的。

Considering the single logistics service platform provider and the single logistics service provider made up of the two-echelon logistics service supply chain, the logistics service provider's decision game about no deception and deception was respectively discussed, so was the influence of each parameter on the game. On this basis, the preference of the logistics service platform provider and logistics service provider in three cases was further analyzed, which is in the centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making and the logistics service provider choosing to deceive. The results indicated that the logistics service platform provider can obtain the maximum profit under the centralized decision-making, while the logistics service providers can obtain the maximum profit under the decentralized decision-making. In a sense, the logistics service platform provider allowing the logistics service provider's deception is benefit.