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Pricing Game Model of Wasted Clothing Recycling and Remanufacturing Based on Government Subsidy

Pricing Game Model of Wasted Clothing Recycling and Remanufacturing Based on Government Subsidy
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摘要 In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil resources, an idea of wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing is put forward. In the new idea a pricing game model is established basing on Stacklberg differential game theory between traditional and remanufactured clothing. In this model, the differences in consumers' willingness to pay and the government's subsidies are considered. Government's optimal subsidy are obtained which ensure not only the interests of manufacturers but also environmental reputation and maximum social benefits. The study is helpful to push the wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing plan. It makes some index more precise quantification as government's subsidy, manufacturers and the social benefits. Government and manufactures can make the detailed cooperation plan reference to it. In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil resources, an idea of wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing is put forward. In the new idea a pricing game model is established basing on Stacklberg differential game theory between traditional and remanufactured clothing. In this model, the differences in consumers' willingness to pay and the government's subsidies are considered. Government's optimal subsidy are obtained which ensure not only the interests of manufacturers but also environmental reputation and maximum social benefits. The study is helpful to push the wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing plan. It makes some index more precise quantification as government's subsidy, manufacturers and the social benefits. Government and manufactures can make the detailed cooperation plan reference to it.
作者 王明敬 庄梅玲 刘晶 WANG Mingjing;ZHUANG Meiling;LIU Jing
出处 《Journal of Donghua University(English Edition)》 EI CAS 2019年第1期46-51,共6页 东华大学学报(英文版)
关键词 wasted CLOTHING RECYCLING and REMANUFACTURING PRICING GAME model government SUBSIDY Stacklberg differential GAME theory wasted clothing recycling and remanufacturing pricing game model government subsidy Stacklberg differential game theory
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