应急环境和非对称信息下两个竞争零售商的供应链批发价契约

Supply chain wholesale price contract with two competing retailers under asymmetric information and disruption

研究了非对称信息下包含一个供应商和两个Bertrand竞争零售商的两级供应链系统批发价契约如何应对突发事件问题.首先在正常状态下,当零售商成本信息为非对称信息时,设计了集中控制下供应链契约和分散控制下供应链批发价契约.当突发事件造成零售商的成本分布变化时,给出了上述两种供应链契约的应急决策.仿真结果表明,当零售商成本扰动在一个很小范围内时,供应商可以保持原生产计划不变,说明原有的契约机制具有一定的鲁棒性;当扰动比较大时,要对原来的生产计划进行调整.

The wholesale price contract models are investigated in a two-level supply chain with one supplier and two Bertrand competing retailers under asymmetric information when the retailer's costs are disrupted.First,supply chain contract models for basic contract in centralized control and wholesale price contract in decentralized control cases are proposed in a regular scenario under asymmetric information(the information of retailer's cost structure is asymmetric).Then,when retailer's cost distribution is fluctuated by disruptions,the optimal react strategies of supply chain are studied.The simulation results show that it is optimal for the supplier to keep original production plan if variation of retailer's cost is fairly small,which shows that the original contract models have certain robustness.Decisions must be adjusted if retailer's cost change is larger.