人力资本套牢的不完全契约分析

<title>An Analysis on Incomplete Contract of the Holdup of Human Asset

风险投资企业在和人力资本市场上的经理签约时,会存在契约不完全现象,导致套牢的产生。和其他两种经济解释不同,本文认为人力资本套牢的原因,是既定契约框架下经理追求准租金的结果。这造成企业成本提高,效率损失。通过设计良好的契约治理结构,自我实施的隐性契约可从一定程度上避免这种现象。

<Abstrcat>When a firm signs the contract with the manager in the human resource market,the contract bears incompleteness.Align to the two other explanations of the holdup,we argure that,the holdup of human asset is the result of manager pursuing quasirent under the fixed contract structure,and it brings to the increase of enterprise cost and the loss of efficiency.The selfimplement implicit contract can,to some extent,avoid this problem by designing a good contract administration structure.