摘要
风险投资企业在和人力资本市场上的经理签约时,会存在契约不完全现象,导致套牢的产生。和其他两种经济解释不同,本文认为人力资本套牢的原因,是既定契约框架下经理追求准租金的结果。这造成企业成本提高,效率损失。通过设计良好的契约治理结构,自我实施的隐性契约可从一定程度上避免这种现象。
<Abstrcat>When a firm signs the contract with the manager in the human resource market,the contract bears incompleteness.Align to the two other explanations of the holdup,we argure that,the holdup of human asset is the result of manager pursuing quasirent under the fixed contract structure,and it brings to the increase of enterprise cost and the loss of efficiency.The selfimplement implicit contract can,to some extent,avoid this problem by designing a good contract administration structure.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第9期19-23,80,共6页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金(10071082)
国家教委博士点基金
中国科学院特别支持费资助项目