System Analysis & Incentive Model Design for Enterprise Contract Management

System Analysis & Incentive Model Design for Enterprise Contract Management Responsibility System(ECMRS)

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摘要 With introducting two testing indices of ECMRS,behavior modal of the contract enterprise and the state in ECMRS are in our paper,then two connive models of ECMRS are made by introducing an audit technique as a means of acquiring information Moreover,a general rule which determines optimal strategy with perfect informtion is also given. With introducting two testing indices of ECMRS,behavior modal of the contract enterprise and the state in ECMRS are in our paper,then two connive models of ECMRS are made by introducing an audit technique as a means of acquiring information Moreover,a general rule which determines optimal strategy with perfect informtion is also given.

作者 LEI Ming(Department of Economy Mangaement,Beijing University,Beijing 100871)FENG Shan(Institute of Systems Engineering,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan Hubei)

出处《Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 CSCD 1994年第1期16-25,共10页 系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）

关键词 enterprise contract management responsibility system incentive strategy AUDIT enterprise contract management responsibility system incentive strategy audit

分类号 N94 [自然科学总论—系统科学]

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1994年第1期

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