摘要
以用电负荷曲线为切入点,通过求解供电侧电网负荷曲线变化最小时的需求侧各用户的最优决策,实现供给侧和需求侧间的纳什均衡;供给侧不具备直接调度需求侧各用户负荷的权限,尝试将供需双方纳什均衡时用户的用电参考负荷作为价格因子用于引导用户用电行为,通过迭代决策实现非合作博弈中纳什均衡的收敛,最终实现电网供给侧负荷控制目标和需求侧电代价最小、收益最大的均衡目标。
According to the characteristics of electric load curves, establish the mechanism of day-ahead electricity pricefor peak shaving and valley filling of the power supply side. And basing on this mechanism, the objective function of the power users' electricity cost was analyzed and a non-cooperative game model was built between users on demand side. Due to the optimization goal of minimizing the costs of the users of the non-cooperative game model, the best response algorithm was used when solving the Nash equilibrium. In line with the relation between convergence of iterative algorithm and objective function, an iterative optimal algorithm was put forward capable of absolute convergence and the selection of iteration parameters was analyzed.
出处
《电信科学》
北大核心
2017年第S1期240-245,共6页
Telecommunications Science
关键词
需求侧
工作机制
非合作博弈
纳什均衡
demand response
working mechanism
non-cooperation game
Nash equilibrium