选择一种人格观念

Choosing a Conception of the Person

本文属于一个试图说明现代多元民主制中的好公民是什么的研究项目。文章将考察人格观念在罗尔斯著作中所发挥的作用,然后提出一种有别于罗尔斯的新型人格观念,但它却能够产生类似的分配原则。这一观念为检验如下议题奠定基础,即当道德在一种人格观念中具有权重时,好公民的本质究竟为何。本文结构如下:首先,我将讨论作为证明哲学论题的方法,诉诸一种立场意味着什么。其次,我将简要讲述罗尔斯从1971年《正义论》到1980年"道德理论中的康德构建主义"演讲中的人格观念发展史。然后以之为出发点,证明人们可以通过一种非康德主义的人格观念、一种聚焦于关心的人格观念,达到与罗尔斯正义两原则相似的事物。

This paper is part of a project to develop an account of the good citizen of a modern,diverse democracy.In the paper,itself,I examine the role of a conception of the person in John Rawlss work and I then propose a conception that differs from Rawlss but yields similar principles of distribution.This sets the stage for examining some issues that arise about the nature of the good citizen when the moral weight is put on a conception of the person.The structure of the paper is as follows.I first discuss what is involved in appealing to a standpoint as a way to justify aphilosophical thesis.I then present a brief tale of Rawlss development from A Theory of Justice(1971)to his stress on a conception of the person in the 1980lectures'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory'.I use this tale as a springboard to argue that one can reach something like Rawlss two principles of justice via a non-Kantian conception of the person,via a conception focused on concern.