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制度是博弈的结果——东韩村案例:农村基层民主制度的演进 被引量:3

Institution is the consequence of the game——A case of Donghan village:the evolution of the democratic institution in the countryside
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摘要 本文以陕西省户县甘亭镇东韩村村民自治制度的缘起、演进、变迁为例,尝试分析我国农村基层民主制度的生发与变迁过程,以说明制度是博弈的纳什均衡。村民自治制度是一种立宪性制度规则,其意义在于,它将所有利益相关者参与的博弈过程最终都必须在集体理性下达到纳什均衡这一费时费力、且不稳定、随机性很强的一次次艰难的制度创新博弈,转化为一种稳定的决策制度,该制度确保了每次决策(即博弈结果)不但体现集体理性,更可保证被有效执行,即具有纳什均衡的性质。当然,这样的制度变迁过程,同样是所有利益相关者——博弈主体需求诱致的产物,其中的强制性措施——可置信的承诺惩罚行动——表现为民主授权与上级政府认可与支持相结合以及《村民委员会组织法》的保护——对于制度的有效性至关重要。本文的分析将表明,政治制度的变迁同样可以放在制度分析框架内来进行研究。 This paper takes the villagers self-governance institution in Donghan village,Ganting town,Hu county,Shanxi province as an example,including this institution's origin,development and change,and tries analyzing the process of the democratic institution's generation and change in the village, in order to show that the institution is the Nash equilibrium of the game.The villagers self-governance institution is a constitutional regulation,whose significance is lying that it coverts the game of institutional innovation which is participate in by all stakeholders, must come to the Nash equilibrium under collective rationality,and is regarded as a time-consuming and laborious,most unstable and random game,to a stable poli- cy-making institution which assures that each policy decision(the consequence of the game)not only shows the collective rationality,but also can be carried out ef- fectively,that is to say it should have the character of the Nash equilibrium.Certainly,such institutional change process is also the product of the stakeholders'(the main body of the game)demand.Among the process,the com- pellable measures that are also called the confident punishing actions(which has been promised)and show as the combination of democratic authorization,higher government approval and support,and conservation by the villager committee or- ganization law,are crucial to the validity of the institutions.This paper's analyze will show that the institutional transition can also be put into the framework of the institutional analysis,and be researched.
作者 黎秀蓉
出处 《制度经济学研究》 2004年第1期74-94,共21页 Research on Institutional Economics
关键词 村民自治 集体决策 立宪性制度 立宪性制度变迁 villagers self-governance collective policy decision constitutional institution the change of constitutional institution
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