强制性类别股东表决机制的效率基础

An Economic Analysis of Mandatory Vote Mechanism of Classes of Shareholders

本文运用企业的契约理论,把公司内部重大决策看作是控制权人和利害相关人在初始契约框架下需要达成的一项子合约,分析了不同监管政策下,双方在达成完全一致方面的不可能性,从而证明引进强制性类别股东表决机制,有利于促进控制权人和流通股股东之间协商机制的贯通。

The major decision inside corporation could be dealt with as a subcon- tract between controlling party and stakeholders within the initial contract series structure.The authors addressed the impossibility of reaching unanimous willing be- tween these two parties under various regulations,demonstrated that introduction of mandatory vote mechanism would be effective and,concluded this mechanism' improvement of negotiation reaching between controlling party and the holders of tradable shares.