我国水资源污染治理的制度分析

Analysis of China Control System of Water Pollution

本文根据我国有关环境保护的基本制度,建立了一个经济博弈理论模型,据此分析认为在目前的管理制度下,我国的水资源治理必然是一个低治理、高污染的均衡结果,虽然短期内可以用政府行政命令的形式达到治理目标,但这种方法是内在矛盾的,不能长期保持的和低效率的。因此,只有改变目前的管理制度,主要是免除地方政府对环境保护的决定权,改变对环境治理的负责体系,才能根本提高我国的环境治理水平并提高污染控制的效率。

According to the China environment protect system,this essay estab- lishes a game model of pollution control and finds that the game outcome must be an undesirable result of low control and high pollution under the basic mechanism. Although the central government can achieve the goal of pollution control by admin- istration command,this result is inevitable transitory and low efficient because of inter contradiction.So the problem of high environment pollution could only be solved by change the pollution control system,mainly revise the law,exempt the local government from the responsibility of environment control and cancel its deter- mine power of pollution control.