从均衡到均衡:制度变迁的主观博弈框架

From Equilibrium to Equilibrium:Towards a subjective game theoretic framework for institutional transformation

经典博弈论在解释那些已经稳定下来的制度是如何起作用的问题上是非常有说服力的;但其隐含的"每个博弈者都知道模型本身"假设在制度变迁问题上很难描述"从均衡到均衡"的跃迁。进化博弈作为与经典博弈论互补的概念,虽然对博弈解概念在稳定或统计意义上给出其合理性证明,但由于强烈依赖于"稳态环境"假设,还存在一些值得拓展之处。结合最近十多年关于博弈论基础的众多重要结果,本文讨论一个在主观博弈(Subjective Game)观点下对这两种行为给出一贯解释并能应用于制度变迁问题的可行性。

Classical game theory can't do well in describing institutional trans- formation process as'jumping up to another equilibrium from an equilibrium', although it gives convictive representation to those stabilized institution.Evolution- ary game theory,as a complementary of classical game theory,only justifies the solution concepts from long-term stability or statistical perspective because of its stationary environment assumption.This thesis discusses the possibility of a subjec- tive game theoretic framework to unify these two notions and to be applied in stud- ying institutional transformation.