双重结构下的激励效应、信息异化与制度安排——环境影响评价公众参与制度的经济学考察

Incentive effects,Information dissimilation and Institution Arrangement in Dual Game Structure——An Economic Explanation to public participation Institution in Environmental Impact Assessment

作为环境民主原则的载体,环境影响评价公众参与在2005年的"环保风暴"中遭遇了重大的制度危机。本文以转型时期作为公众参与主要组织者的地方政府官员为核心、分别以其上级主管部门和辖区内公众为与官员展开博弈的相对方构造双重博弈框架,考察公众参与制度在复合博弈下的激励效应及官员相应的策略选择收敛点,揭示了侵蚀公众参与的制度绩效且易为学界忽视的信息异化现象。基于信息费用约束,作者指出应发挥科层组织的比较激励优势重置行政场域的激励安排,以应对信息异化引致的"司法失灵"。借助双重博弈框架,作者对格拉诺维特、青木昌彦提出的"嵌入/关联博弈中长期博弈具有抑制短期博弈机会主义之功"的命题确定前提条件和适用边界,并对边界之外长期/短期博弈的"嵌入"/"关联"效应给出不同结论。

Public participation institution in environment impact assessment en- countered a crucial challenge in 2005's'environmental protection storm'.In this paper,the author firstly puts forward a dual game structure:'superior adminis- trative organizations——local officials——local residents',and by then analyzing the incentive effects and local officials' correspondent equilibrium strategy,this paper points out the information dissimilation that deeply eroded public participa- tion institution performance but is often overlooked by researchers.Considering in- formation cost constraint and hierarchy' comparative incentive advantage,institu- tional incentive measures should be rearranged in the administrative domain to cope with'judicature failure'.Finally,by right of the dual structure,this paper lim- its valid boundary for Granovetter and Aoki's conclusion:if a short-term game is embedded in or linked with a long-term game,the latter can curb opportunistic in- centive arising from the former,and gives different conclusions on the premise that differs from Granovetter and Aoki's.