摘要
具有高度公众知名度的市场主体通过媒体和曝光的方式发布公共信息,会对福利造成什么样的影响?我们在这样一种背景下验证了公共信息的影响,即参与人采取的行动完全符合基本理论,但他们也有从其行动的策略补充中产生的合作动机。当参与人没有具有社会价值的私人信息时,提供更多的公共信息通常会提高社会福利。然而,当参与人也能够获得独立的信息来源时,不断增加的公共曝光对福利造成的影响具有不确定性。
What are the welfare effects of enhanced dissemination of public in- formation through the media and disclosures by market participants with high pub- lic visibility?We examine the impact of public information in a setting where agents take actions appropriate to the underlying fundamentals,but they also have a coordination motive arising from a strategic complementarity in their actions. When the agents have no socially valuable private information,greater provision of public information always increases welfare.However,when agents also have ac- cess to independent sources of information,the welfare affect of increased public disclosures is ambiguous.
出处
《制度经济学研究》
2007年第2期182-201,共20页
Research on Institutional Economics
关键词
公共信息
社会价值
Social Value
Public Information