摘要
随着中国银行业的发展和对外开放步伐的加快,各种资本入股商业银行,形成了银行股权结构的多元化局面。在这个过程中,不少商业银行的股东利用其控制权或重大影响力获得大量关联贷款,进行关联交易,不仅侵害了银行其他股东和存款人的利益,也威胁我国的金融安全,甚至损害了整个国民经济的发展。股东投资是为了追求商业利益,在市场经济下,本不应该对进入商业银行的资本进行限制。但是,由于银行经营的脆弱性和风险传染性,政府部门必须对其进行监管。监管部门通过一定的制度设计,使股东在追逐自己利益的同时,促进整个银行业的健康发展和整个生产力的提高。本文把商业银行的股东作为研究对象,强调要加强对商业银行股东的监管,以保障银行股东的合格性,并通过引进积极、合格股东来改善商业银行的公司治理,提高商业银行的经营能力和盈利水平。
With the development of china's bank industry and the acceleration of china's open process,many capitals are invested in commercial banks,leading to the multiplication of ownership structure in banks.But during this process,many commercial bank's shareholders using their control power or important influence to gain many insider trading.Those not only harm other shareholders and creditors' benefit,but also threaten china's financial safety,even hinder the development of china's economy.In market economy,the access to the market shouldn't be restrict- ed.But because of the frangibility and the infectivity of the bank industry,the shareholders need to be supervised by the government.By certain institution de- sign,the government make shareholder pursue their own profit as well as facilita- ting the development of the bank industry and the advancement of the economy.We treat the bank shareholder as our research object.By the regulation on the bank shareholder,we introduce the active shareholders to improve the corporate govern- ance of the bank and advance the ability of the management and earning
出处
《制度经济学研究》
2007年第3期101-113,共13页
Research on Institutional Economics
基金
魏建负责的山东大学青年成长基金项目"法律经济分析的有效性及其在中国的应用"
山东省社科规划办重点项目"行为法经济学的基础理论及应用研究"(06JDB030)的阶段成果
教育部"新世纪优秀人才"计划
教育部社会科学研究重大攻关项目"马克思主义产权理论
现代西方产权理论与中国改革实践"(负责人:黄少安
项目号04JZD007)的资助
关键词
银行股东
合格股东
监管
公司治理
Bank Shareholder
Qualified Shareholder
Supervision and Regulation
Corporate Governance