摘要
本文将阐明,不论何时,拥有不受挑战武力的理性自利者在武力能够发挥作用的范围内,都具有共容的稳定利益,他们将按照与社会和其他目标利益一致的方式行事,并且达到了令人吃惊的程度。好像是统治力量受到一只隐藏之手的指引,对我们而言,这跟亚当·斯密时期市场上那只看不见的手一样一点也不荒谬。事实上,当拥有武力的最优实体有足够大的共容利益——我们定义为超级共容利益时,看不见的手将会非常突出地引导它像对待他们自己一样对待武力的其他目标。
The Essay will demonstrate that they do-that whenever a rational self-interested actor with enquestioned coercive power has an encompassing and stable interest in the domain over which the power is exercised,that actor is led to act in ways that are,to s surprising degree,consistent with the interests of society and of those subject to that power.It is as if the ruling power were guided by a hid- den hand no less paradoxical for us than the invisible hand in the market was for people in Adam Smith's time.In fact,when an optimizing entity with coercive power has a sufficiently encompassing interest-what we define as a super-encom- passing interest-the invisible hand will lead it remarkably,to treat those subject to its power as well as it treats itself.
出处
《制度经济学研究》
2007年第4期184-213,共30页
Research on Institutional Economics
关键词
独裁
多数票规则
共容利益
权力
Autocracy
Majority Rule
Encompassing Interest
Power