“平行志愿”录取机制研究

An Economic Analysis of the 'Paralleling Preference'College Admission Mechanism

"平行志愿"录取机制是一种不同于传统"志愿优先"的录取机制,对该机制引起的教育改革的福利效应和考生的填报策略有关问题的研究结果包括:相对于传统的"志愿优先"录取机制,这个制度变革对全体考生来说不是帕累托改进;分析了"平行志愿"录取操作中的志愿数目限制只能填报3个学校的影响,增加考生可以填报的志愿学校数对低分考生不利;计算了考生信念是均匀分布时不同考生的均衡策略和在均衡中的录取概率分布。

The welfare effect of the reformation of college admission mechanism and the strategies of students under the new mechanism are investigated.The'Paralleling Preference'Mechanism is different from the traditional'Preference First'Mechanism.But the reformation is not a Pareto improvement for all students.The increase of quota in submitted preference is disadvantageous to students with low scores.The equilibriums under the new mechanism are calculated when the students have the common independent and uniform beliefs.