摘要
本文从激励相容的视角,对银行监管理论的已有成果进行了梳理:先是从保护存款人利益的角度,考察对政府银行监管必要性的争论;接着总结了激励相容理论的主要思想,并提出银行监管理论新的分析范式;在此基础上,围绕如何设计激励相容的银行监管机制,从其基本内容即资本监管、监督检查银行、市场约束和存款保险制度等方面进行文献回顾,最后就是否存在最优的银行监管体制进行评价。
From an incentive-compatible perspective,this paper reviews recent theories on the banking regulation and supervision.Based on protecting the benefit of the depositors,We firstly discuss why need government to regulate the banking; Secondly,we present a new analytic framework on the banking regulation and supervision after summarizing original thought on the incentive compatibility;Then we focus on how to design the incentive-compatible mechanism of the banking regulation and supervision,that is optimal capital regulation,monitoring,market discipline and deposit insurance system;finally,we comment on whether or not the optimal mechanism of the banking regulation and supervision is possible.
出处
《制度经济学研究》
CSSCI
2009年第3期187-203,共17页
Research on Institutional Economics
关键词
激励相容
存款人利益
银行监管机制
incentive compatibility
the benefit of the depositors
mechanism of the banking regulation and supervision
