摘要
合同救济旨在于实现合同总剩余最大化和增进社会福利。强制履行是违约救济措施之一,与损害赔偿等救济措施具有同等地位。强制履行在促进合同投资和实现当事人利润最大化方面的效率与期待利益赔偿没有差别。二者在交易费用方面没有差别。就最优投资激励和交易费用节省而言,它们都不能成为最优违约救济措施。违约救济措施的适用应尊重当事人的选择。我国合同法对强制履行的规定体现了合同自由原则,充分尊重了当事人的选择。
The remedies of contract breach aim at maximizing contracts total surplus and promoting social welfare.As main measures of breach remedies like specific performance and expected damages have equal status with other.Specific performance and expected damages are no difference in inducing efficient investment and realizing parties' maximization of profits.They are also no difference in transaction costs.They are not optimal Breach Remedies in providing optimal investment and reducing transaction costs.The choice of remedies measures should respect the choice of the parties.The provision of China's Contract Law on specific performance indicates the principle of contract freedom and respects the parties' choice.
出处
《制度经济学研究》
CSSCI
2009年第4期40-61,共22页
Research on Institutional Economics
关键词
强制履行
期待赔偿
法经济学
specific performance
expected damages
law and economics