摘要
实际履行和损害赔偿是合同法里关于违约救济最为常见的任意性条款,单独适用其一都会产生一定的效率损失。本文通过一个简单的模型,证明在相应的约束条件满足时通过违约救济方式的单方选择,不仅可以区分不同类型的债权人,并且可以让债务人事先采取相应的预防水平,从而有可能更为有效地实现有效违约。
Specific performance and compensatory damages are the two most common default remedy rules for breach of contract in contract law.However, when each one applies alone,some efficiency loss will occur.This paper tries to solve it by designing a mechanism through which one party to the contract can opt for one remedy under some circumstances such that different types of creditors can be distinguished ex ante on the one hand,debtors can also take proper level of precaution on the other hand.Eventually,efficient breach can be much more satisfied.
出处
《制度经济学研究》
CSSCI
2009年第4期62-72,共11页
Research on Institutional Economics
关键词
实际履行
损害赔偿
单方选择
有效违约
specific performance
compensatory damages
one-party option efficient breach