摘要
在处理金融不良债权案件的过程中,针对不同身份的债权人,我国的法院分别适用了截然不同的两套司法政策,而这一点正折射出了当下中国法院和法官承担的政治性职能。本文试图解释在处理这类案件中,中国法院和法官的激励和约束因素,并分析我国司法部门承担政治性职能过程中可能引发的一系列问题。
In the process of dealing with non-performing loan disputes,China's courts apply totally different judicial policies to different kind of creditors,which reflects the political function of the court in China,how a judge or a court behaves depends on the political and legal system as a whole,a judge or a court's rational choice and the outside influence and press.Also,the court in today's China plays a substitutive role for the legislative and administrative section,which renders it looking like not only a body acting as a referee but also a public regulator.
出处
《制度经济学研究》
CSSCI
2009年第4期90-117,共28页
Research on Institutional Economics
关键词
不良债权
法院
政治职能
non-performing loan
court
political function