异质产品、中间品贸易与最优研究和开发政策

Differentiated goods,intermediate product and optimal R&D policy

本文通过拓展斯潘塞和布兰德的模型,考虑非一体化的本国企业向一体化的外国企业购买中间产品,并进行成本降低型研发时本国政府的最优研发政策。与斯潘塞和布兰德的结论不同,本文的研究表明,当企业进行古诺竞争(产量竞争)时,若产品差异程度较大(小),本国政府的最优研发政策为征税(补贴),而当企业进行伯川德竞争(价格竞争)时,本国政府的最优研发策略则总是征税。

Extending the model of Spencer and Brander(1983),the paper analyses the government's R&D policy when an un-integrated domestic firm purchases a key intermediate product from a integrated foreign firm and then competes with it in the final product market.The finding which is different with Spencer and Brander (1983) shows the optimal policy is taxing(subsiding) on R&D in the setting of cournot competition when the degree of product differentiation is larger(lower) and the optimal policy is tax on R&D in the setting of Bertrond competition.