摘要
经验研究表明实验主体显示出一系列的禀赋效应,已有的研究还不能对这一行为存在的原因提供可接受的解释,本文表明禀赋效应可以模型化为在缺乏法律机构确保第三方合约得到执行的情况下对私有产权的认可。在这种意义上,"自然"的私有产权以承认领土在职者的形式在大多数物种中被观察到。基于老鹰一鸽子一资产阶级博弈和消耗战,本文发展了一个模型来解释私有产权的自然演进。
Experimental studies have shown that subjects exhibit a systematic endowment effect.No acceptable explanation for the existence of this behavior has been offered.This paper shows that the endowment effect can be modeled as respect for private property in the absence of legal institutions ensuring third-party contract enforcement In this sense,'natural'private property has been observed in many species,in the form of recognition of territorial incumbency.We develop a model loosely based on the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game(Maynard Smith,J., Parker,G.A.,1976.The logic of asymmetric contests.Animal Behaviour 24, 159-175) and the War of Attrition[Maynard Smith,J.,Price,G.R.,1973. The logic of animal conflict.Nature 246,15-18]to explain the natural evolution of private property.
出处
《制度经济学研究》
CSSCI
2009年第4期219-238,共20页
Research on Institutional Economics
关键词
私有产权
禀赋效应
演进
private property
endowment effect
evolution
