公司和农户如何选择稳定性契约治理机制——一个基于两维度的理论模型

How to Select the Contractual Stability Governance Mechanism for Corporation and Peasant Households:A Theoretical Model Based on Two Dimensions

本文构建一个两维度的重复博弈模型,从供应链中的重复交易关系视角分析公司和农户间契约自我实施的稳定性条件及其契约选择的一般理论。一个主要的发现是,所有权结构和关系性产权配置结构在相互制约中影响契约的稳定性和可自我实施性。当公司和农户偏好风险中性时,垂直一体化是对价格频繁且大幅波动的有效反应;是否纵向一体化取决于贴现率r,当贴现率足够低时,所有权结构开始变得无足轻重;而如果其他特征变量不变,最优所有权安排取决于报偿水平的高低。

This paper constructs a two dimensionality repeated game model analyzing the theory about corporation and peasant households' contractual conditions on self-enforcing and contractual choice.The main conclusion is,ownership structure and allocation structure of relational right influence on contractual stability and self-enforcing in the mutual restriction.Vertical integration is the valid reaction of price fluctuating frequently and substantially when corporation and peasant household prefer to neutral risk;whether integration depends on discount rate,and ownership structure set out of little importance when discount rate tends to let down enough;whereas optimal property right arrangement depends on the dimension of pay-off if other characteristic variances constant.