摘要
本文在国家竞争与交易成本基础上提出了三个命题:制度设计的双向效应、经济增长的双重机制,以及国家竞争的本质。制度设计的双向效应是指从协作和竞争的视角来看,现实中既有旨在降低交易成本的制度设计,也有旨在提升交易成本的制度安排。技术不仅是一种增长要素,更是一种竞争要素,这就造就了经济增长的双重机制:产出的绝对增长和竞争抑制下的相对增长。权力是国家竞争的本质,技术的制度属性是国家竞争权力的来源。国家在权力的基础上实现交易成本的分配,"自然选择"的演化过程决定了权力本身是路径依赖的,因此国家间交易成本必然向权力派生的成本收敛。本文为拓展经济增长研究提供了一个新的思路。
According to country competition and transaction cost,we have put forward three propositions:dual effect of institutional arrangement and economic growth,essence of the country competition.The dual effect of institutional arrangement is in reality,the institutional arrangement reducing or raising transaction cost is both existing.Technology is not only a growth factor,but also a competitive element which created the dual mechanism of economic growth.Power is the essence of national competition,and institutional property of technology is the source of national competitive power.The distribution of transaction costs among countries are based on the power,and 'natural selection' determines that the evolution of power itself is path dependent.Therefore,transaction costs among countries are bound to converging toward the power.This article provides a new thinking for the research on economic growth.
出处
《制度经济学研究》
CSSCI
2010年第3期1-32,共32页
Research on Institutional Economics
基金
2010年东南大学优秀博士基金支持
关键词
国家竞争
权力
交易成本
演化
national competition
power
transaction costs
evolution