基于克服政府行为负外部性视角下的新农保制度优化

Optimization of China’s New Rural Endowment Insurance System:based on The Perspective of Eliminating Negative Externalities of Government Behavior

运用政府行为外部性理论,对新型农村社会养老保险试运行过程中的政府行为进行分析,发现新农保制度中的政府行为负外部性主要体现在:新农保政策的制定不能够同时满足所有农民的利益最大化取向,地方政府存在着较严重的政府行为负外部性,老农保对新农保制度有相当的负面影响。为此,只有理顺中央政府和地方政府之间的事权关系,加强政策执行的双重监督,加强新制度的宣传,增强政府承诺,才能进一步优化新农保制度。

By using Theory of the External Government to analyze the behavior of governments at all levels during the trial operation of the new rural endowment insurance system(NREIS),we found find in NREIS that,the negative externality is mainly reflected in:The new rural endowment insurance policies can not meet the interests of all the farmers to maximize each orientation;There are serious negative externalities in local governments;The former rural endowment insurance system has a considerable negative impact on NREIS.Therefore,only by straightening out the powers relationship between central government and local government and strengthening the dual supervision of the implementation of policies,as well as strengthening the publicity of the new system and enhancing the government’s commitment, can NREIS be further optimized.