市场竞争度、公司治理与高管薪酬——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据

Market Competition Corporate Governance and Top Managers Compensation

选取2003-2008年我国A股上市公司作为样本,首先从薪酬业绩相关性角度全面考察了我国上市公司高管薪酬的形成机制,随后从公司治理和市场竞争度两个角度来考察其对薪酬业绩相关性的影响。实证研究表明,上市公司高管薪酬受到多重因素的影响,其中至关重要的一个因素便是企业当期的业绩水平,有效证明我国高管薪酬已不断开始显著与业绩水平挂钩;同时薪酬水平很大程度上还受到本公司治理水平的影响,公司治理除本身对薪酬额度产生影响外,还对薪酬业绩相关性产生了影响,即公司治理好的公司,其高管薪酬水平可能更加依赖于除业绩之外的因素;最后,市场竞争度也较显著地影响到上市公司高管薪酬,而市场竞争度更重要的作用在于促进了薪酬业绩的相关性水平。

Using data on China’s A share listed companies from 2003 to 2008,this paper fully investigated the formation mechanism of executive compensation from the perspective of pay-performance sensitivity of listed companies in China firstly;and then examine the pay-performance sensitivity from the degree of market competition and corporate governance. Empirical research shows that executive pay is affected by multiple factors,and the critical factors is the performance of current levels of business,which effective proved that executive pay has been started by the performance levels significantly in China;executive pay also affected by the level of corporate governance,corporate governance not only impacts the salary amount,but also impacts the pay-performance sensitivity,that is,the company with good corporate governance its executive pay levels may be more dependent on outside factors besides performance;Finally,the degree of market competition are more significant impact on executive pay,while a more important role of the degree of market competition is to promote the pay-performance sensitivity level,and that means enhancing the social competition can promote the development of enterprises.