公司治理与债务成本——对发生高管腐败上市公司的研究

Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt——An Analysis of the Listed Companies with the Corruption of Executives

高管腐败是代理冲突的一种极端表现形式。在以2000年至2009年发生高管腐败案件的上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了公司治理优劣对企业债务融资成本的影响,以及公司高管腐败与公司治理的关系之后,研究发现,高管腐败公司其债务融资成本在腐败曝光后显著上升,腐败行为最终会导致较高的债务融资成本,公司的代理冲突会提高债务融资成本。而第一大股东持股比例、董事会规模等公司治理变量与高管腐败成正相关,表明良好的公司治理能缓解代理冲突,最终降低债务成本。

By using the samples of listed companies with the corruption of high-ranking managers during the period from 2000-2009 and treating the corruption as the extreme results of agency conflicts,it will be found that,comparing to the non-corrupt companies,the cost of debt for corrupt companies greatly increased after expositing the scandals.These results mean that agency conflicts will increase the cost of debt. Besides,the ratio of shareholding of the largest shareholder and the board size are positively associated with the probability of corruption. All of these suggest that excellent corporate governance can reduce agency conflicts faced by debt stakeholders,and it plays an important role in the making-decision of granting a loan.