2[3]Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart.An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem[J].Econometria,1983,51(1):7-45.
3[4]Bengt Holmstrom.Moral Hazard and Observability[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10(1):74-91.
4[5]Steven Shavell.Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10 (1):55-73.
5[6]Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom.Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:incentive contracts,asset ownership and job design[J].Journal of Law,Economics,and Organization,1991,7 (Special Issue):24-52.
6[7]Canice Prendergast and Robert Topel.Discretion and bias in performance evaluation[J].European Economic Review,1993,37:355-365.
7[8]Canice Prendergast and Robert Topel.Favoritism in Organizations[J].Journal of Political Economy,1996,104(5):958-978.
8[9]Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom.Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives[J].Econometrica,1987,55 (2):303-328.
9[10]Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort.The theory of incentives[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,2002.