自由现金流代理问题的验证

Test of Agency Problem in Free Cash Flow

本文将委托代理理论与公司财务理论交叉研究,分析了自由现金流的代理问题出现的行业特征以及公司红利政策、投资政策。选择效益一直很好的白酒行业为调查对象,验证了在我国自由现金流的代理问题的存在,并探讨了相关的减小代理成本的财务政策,即分红、股票回购、债务融资与增强经理人报酬业绩相关性。这对于一些利润丰厚、现金流充足的国企公司治理也具有借鉴意义。

This paper concludes the characteristics of agency in free cash flow, and gives some benchmarks. The alcoholic industry is discussed and all public companies are computed. The alcoholic industry is compared with others, it is found that the agency problem in free cash flow exists in china. We also give some proposals to decrease the agency cost from the view of corporate finance, such as dividend policy, equity buyback, debt financing, and increase of correspondence between performance and mangers' compensation. The result would benefit the governance of SOEs with large profits and cash flow.