摘要
在声誉问题上 ,提出理性人追求不确定性最小化的假定 ,建立了一个考虑到时间和信息成本的模型。对该模型的分析表明 ,信息成本和获取信息能力决定了博弈人对声誉的取舍。该模型是对 KMRW声誉模型的一个改进。
By addressing the hypothesis that the rational individual seeks the minimization of uncertainty to the reputation and credit problem, a new model is given, in which the cost of time and information is taken into consideration. The analysis of the new model reveals that the information cost and the ability of obtaining information determines the player's behavior mode referring to reputation and credit. The new model is an improvement to the KMRW reputation model.
出处
《系统工程理论方法应用》
2002年第3期253-259,共7页
Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications
