摘要
经理人是一种特质人力资本,在市场上企业家的供求实际上是经理人和企业两个主体间的契约交易。由于交易对象的特殊性和信息的不完全性,交易双方都存在隐蔽信息和隐蔽行为,这使得交易过程分成相互联系的两个部分:事前交易和事后交易。前者是特质人力资本的供给者未被企业聘用前与企业的博弈过程;后者则是经理人被选聘进入企业后与股东(董事会)的博弈过程。由于选聘经理的事前交易是“即时的”,而经理努力(工作业绩)却是“未来的”,这种交易的时滞性会促使交易双方努力去探寻和构建一种经理报酬制度。经理报酬需要“预期性”,股票期权作为一种制度安排即是连续交易和经理行为“预期性”的产物。
This paper argues that managers are a human capital with special characteristics. The supply and demand on the manager market is, in reality, a transaction between individual managers and enterprises. Due to the special characteristics of what is transaction, and the inadequacy of information available, there exists inevitably certain degree of hidden information and behind-the-scene actions on both sides. The trade process is thus divided into two stages: pre-appointment trading and post-appointment trading. The former is a process where the supplier of the human capital games with the enterprises prior to being employed whereas the latter is a process where the manager deals with the shareholders or board of trustees after being employed. Post-appointment trade is a continuation of the pre-appointment trade; it is an game process of 'ability equilibrium'after the 'quantity equilibrium'negotiation process is done.While the pre-appointment trading of an enterprises employing a manager is 'on-line'process, the post-appointment trading of a manager demonstrating his/her effort (achievement) is a 'future'process. The time lag can help both the supply and the demand sides to seek and establish an appropriate payment system.Manager payment needs to have certain predictability. The Executive Stock Option, as such a system, is a result of the continuous trading process and the predictability of manager actions.
出处
《江苏社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第4期44-51,共8页
Jiangsu Social Sciences
基金
本文是国家教育部人文社会科学博士点基金研究项目的阶段性研究成果
项目负责人周立群
项目名称"企业家职业化进程与社会培育机制研究"
编号98JBY630004。
关键词
经理人市场
经理报酬
供求关系
交易关系
manger market hidden information hidden action quantity equilibrium ability equilibrium stock option annual stipendsystem