摘要
Based on the data from villages with different economic development levels in Fujian province, this paper explores how the Organic Law and other regulations regarding village committee elections are implemented. According to the theoretical framework of rational choice institutionalism, the author regards villagers, candidates and township cadres as rational actors, who calculate their costs and benefits in elections and take actions that can maximize their interests. Of course, their strategic alternatives are influenced and structured by these rational actors’ statuses and channeled by established institutions. It is these rational actors’ strategic alternatives that intentionally or unconsciously facilitate the implementation of the system of village committee elections.
Based on the data from villages with different economic development levels in Fujian province, this paper explores how the Organic Law and other regulations regarding village committee elections are implemented. According to the theoretical framework of rational choice institutionalism, the author regards villagers, candidates and township cadres as rational actors, who calculate their costs and benefits in elections and take actions that can maximize their interests. Of course, their strategic alternatives are influenced and structured by these rational actors' statuses and channeled by established institutions. It is these rational actors' strategic alternatives that intentionally or unconsciously facilitate the implementation of the system of village committee elections.
出处
《社会学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第2期94-109,共16页
Sociological Studies
