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基于博弈视角的农村土地整治研究 被引量:2

Research on Rural Land Rearrangement Based on Game Theory
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摘要 当前我国农村土地整治过程中农民的利益得不到保障,部分地区地方政府对土地整治积极性不高,土地整治工作进展受阻。结合当前我国农村土地整治面临的困境与工作难度,将农村土地整治过程简化成不完全信息动态博弈下的博弈模型,通过对中央政府、地方政府和农民群体三方博弈主体行为进行分析,得出农村土地整治的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡。结合博弈分析结论提出政策激励建议:(1)建立地方政府可持续发展的综合指标政绩考核机制;(2)充分尊重群众意愿,保障农民权益;(3)提高各参与方的积极性,建立科学有效的激励机制。 Farmers' interests not being protected, some local governments with low land rearrangement enthusiasm, and being blocked workprogress have been the major problems that we face in rural land rearrangement process. This paper simplifies the process of rural landrearrangement into game model under dynamic game with incomplete information in line with the difficulties that we face in the work ofland rearrangement. Through analysis of the subjective behavior of tripartite game such as the central government, local government, andfarmers group, the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of rural land rearrangement has been obtained. On this basis, this paper proposes that amechanism to check on the local government upon the achievements of a synthetic index of sustainable development must be established. Inaddition, we should fully respect the will of the masses, protect farmers' rights and interests, enhance the enthusiasm of all participants, andestablish a scientific and effective incentive mechanism.
作者 刘戈 刘伟 LIU Ge;LIU Wei(School of Economics and Management, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China;Tianjin Urbanization & Neo-rural Construction Research Center, Tianjin 300384, China)
出处 《中国国土资源经济》 2016年第10期38-42,13,共6页 Natural Resource Economics of China
基金 国家科技支撑计划"村镇建设用地再开发市场调控关键技术研究"(2013BAJ13B02)
关键词 农村土地整治 博弈 精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡 政策 rural land renovation game refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium policy
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