互联网消费金融中的逆向选择和道德风险研究——基于信号传递和重复博弈的视角

Research on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard of Internet Consumer Finance: Based On Signal Transmission Model and Repeated Game Model

采用博弈论的方法——信号传递模型和无限重复博弈模型,对互联网消费金融中由于信贷双方信息不对称而产生的逆向选择和道德风险问题进行了理论分析。结合互联网消费金融的自身特点,引入信用共享机制,分析得出了不同参数变化对博弈均衡的影响。结果表明当单次贷款的利率越低,单次信贷额度越低,低收入消费者的伪装成本越高和对消费者违约的信用惩罚越重时,可以有效地防止逆向选择的发生,使信用贷款流入高收入群体;而随着信息共享程度越深,消费金融服务的频次越高,由消费者主观意愿导致的道德风险就会越低,互联网消费金融活动开展就越顺利。

This article adopts the method of game theory, signal transmission model and infinitelyrepeated game model to solve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems between both sides inInternet consumer finance which caused by information asymmetry. Combined with the characteristicsof the Internet consumer finance, introduce the mechanism of sharing the credit The influence of maininfluence factors on the equilibrium of the game is analyzed. The results show that the lower loaninterest rates, the smaller single credit lines, the higher signaling disguise low-income consumers costs,the heavier penalty to consumer and the higher the frequency of consumption credit service, Internetconsumer finance activities carry out more smoothly.