产业联盟的制度经济学分析--兼论我国医联体的决策机制设计

An Institutional Analysis of Strategic Alliance--On the Decision-making Mechanism of Hospital Alliance

产业联盟是经济发展到一定高度的产物,有助于解决中国产业发展中涌现出的实际问题,进而被我国积极借鉴,但在现实中的运行结果不佳,由此本文对其中的关键问题以及机制应对进行了系统探讨。研究发现联盟中存在收益与支出的短期背离现象,强势个体的利益得不到保障,缺乏积极参与的动力。产业联盟运行并健康发展的关键源于制度创新,有必要通过机制设计给予优势企业足够的回馈,而机制设计必须涉及多期的利益分配,至少提高强势主体对于后期利益的支配权力,以便激励其主动参与。具体而言,应给予强势个体更多的决策权力,确保他们的切身利益,以此形成制度激励。为了更好地说明如上问题,本文结合医疗联合体个案予以论述,并就以上结论在政策上的具体应用给予了说明。

Strategic alliance is more popular in Chinanowadays and it helps solve arising problems in industrialdevelopment.However,it encountersbottlenecks in reality.This paper is aimed to find out the key contradictionsamongthe asymmetric enterprises,and tries to establish a mechanismthat using a political equilibrium to balance the multi-players’interests.More specifically,the mechanism gives the privilegedenterprises more power to influence the applied policy undercertain condition,which in turn encourages high-productivityenterprises to spare no effort to be privileged.