一种带有语义和认识论预设的形而上学——评克里普克的自然种类实在论取向

A metaphysics attached with semantic and epistemic assumptions: Kripke's orientation of natural kind realism

在《命名与必然性》中,克里普克解释了自然种类词"如何指称",但是没有解释自然种类词"指称什么"。从克里普克认为自然种类词具有"严格性"来看,他接受一种自然种类实在论,将自然种类视为自然种类词的指称。为这种实在论提供支持的是克里普克的类本质主义。克氏类本质主义由语义分析导出,但是接受一些形而上学的预设。克里普克为自然种类提供一种带有语义和认识论预设的形而上学解释,其自然种类实在论取向可见于认识论、形而上学和语义学三个层面,认识或对之做出回应,需要考虑应当以及如何给哪个层面的问题以优先解决。

In Naming and Necessity, Kripke interprets how the term of the natural kind refers, but he fails to explain what. However, he suggests that both proper names and the terms of the natural kind are rigid designators, which dooms him to accept a natural kind realism. Kripke supports such realism with his Kind Essentialism, which is not only based on semantic analysis, but also supported with some metaphysical presuppositions. Kripke provides a metaphysical interpretation of natural kinds which is attached with semantic and epistemic assumptions. His orientation of naturalkind realism could be seen at three levels: epistemology, metaphysics and semantics. To understand or respond to Kripke’s orientation, it needs to consider what problems should be given priority to solve and how to solve them.