企业与地方政府预算软约束的概念求异辨析——基于几种分权模式的视角

Different Concepts of Soft Budget Constraints of Enterprise and Local Government——Based on the Patterns of Decentralization

随着财政联邦主义的兴起,预算软约束的概念从转型国家的国有企业发展到了地方政府。少有学者注意到概念之间存在一定差别。本文从预算约束概念的不同、软约束中"软"概念的不同和政策性负担意义的不同三个方面论述了企业预算软约束和政府预算软约束的区别。在此基础上,从权力划分的视角出发,归纳了九种不同的分权形式和三种不同的软约束形式,定义预算软约束的概念为预算作为权力博弈结果的契约没有被博弈各方共同遵守。同时通过模型化的方式阐述了地方政府预算软约束的主因为委托代理关系等因素对权力独立性的弱化。最后将理论与我国目前的现实问题相结合进行讨论,结论表明我国目前的分权情况比较接近纵向中等分权和横向集权的情况,因此容易发生纵向预算软约束,而改善横向分权状况是提高我国居民福利的有效路径。

With the rise of fiscal federalism,the concept of soft budget constraint has developed from state-owned enterprise to local government in country in transition,but few scholars have noted the essential differences between the twoconcepts.This article discusses the differences between enterprise and government soft budget constraint from the conceptof soft budget constraint,the“soft”concept and the meaning of policy burden.On the basis of the above,from the perspective of separation of powers,it summarizes nine different patterns of separation of powers and three different types ofsoft constraints.It defines the concept of soft budget constraint as follows:budget is the result of power game,but the contract has not been observed by the players concerned.Meanwhile,with a model,it expounds that the reason for soft budgetconstraint of local government is the weakening of the independence of power caused by the principal-agent relationship.Finally,it combines the theory with the current reality of China.The conclusion shows that China’s separation of powers isrelatively close to the moderate vertical decentralization and the horizontal centralization.Therefore,China is prone to thevertical soft budget constraint.Improving the situation of horizontal decentralization is an effective path to enhance thewelfare of residents in China.