剩余资本模型下资本供应链对突发事件的协调应对

The Coordination of Capital Supply Chain against Emergency in Surplus Capital Model

资本流动在现代经济中越来越受到重视。众多学者从不同角度,对资本做了大量的研究工作。本文试图通过对传统供应链契约的比较研究,以中国上市银行呆坏账率数据为基础,引入风险因子,建立剩余资本处理模型,研究在面对突发事件时资本供应链的最优协调策略。研究发现,资本供应链在剩余资本契约下同样具有很强的鲁棒性。突发事件引起市场规模正向变化幅度较大时,整个资本供应链的最优资本价格先减小,到一定程度后又增大,这从侧面验证了对于蕴含风险的资本,需求增大价格降低,但降低到一定程度同时也积累了巨大泡沫,导致资本谨慎价格升高。并且,只有风险因子保持在一定水平的区间范围,资本供应商及整个资本供应链才有协调动力。

In modern economy,capital attracts more attention.There are so many scholars carrying out enormous research on capital from different angles.With the help of comparative analysis on traditional supply chain contract,taking bad loan ratio of China’s listed banks as the basis,by introducing risk factors and establishing surplus capital model,the author carries out research on the optimal coordination strategy for capital supply chain to cope with emergency.It is found that,in surplus capital contract,capital supply chain still has very strong robustness.When there are significant positive changes caused by emergency,the optimal capital price of the overall capital supply chain will decline first,and it will begin to rise while achieving a certainlevel.This testifies that,for capital involving risk,the price will decline with the increase of demand;when the price declines toa certain level,there will be huge bubble accumulated,which will lead to rising capital price and the caution of that.Besides,only when risk factors are maintained in a certain range,will capital suppliers and the overall capital supply chain have driving force for coordination.