摘要
非公开发行(定增)是支持上市公司持续发展的重要融资手段之一。2017年2月定增新规2发布之前,定增定价机制允许上市公司在董事会决议公告日、股东大会决议公告日和发行期首日中选择定价基准日,且多数上市公司选择董事会决议公告日作为定价基准日,容易引发价差陷阱。本文通过对2012年至2015年期间的1714例定增的样本数据进行实证研究,分析发现了定增中存在的资源错配问题以及控股股东的掏空行为,并从定价机制、审批流程以及事中事后监管方面提出了进一步改革定增制度的政策建议。
Abstract:Private equity placement is one of the major financing methods for listed firms.Before the latest Regulation of Private Placement published in February2017,it was allowed that firms can select the following three dates as a benchmark date of pricing,i.e.the board resolution announcement date,general shareholders’meeting announcement date or the first date of issue.Most listed firms(more than95%)have chosen board resolution announcement date,which lead to the fact that the offer price of placing is greatly discounted as compared to market price.To address this issue,this study investigates the adverse allocation of resource and market manipulation in the process of placement price-setting.Furthermore,this study analyzes the causes and outcomes of the great price discount based on empirical work.Additionally,this study proposes some suggestions for the reform of private place regulation.
出处
《金融监管研究》
2017年第3期73-83,共11页
Financial Regulation Research
关键词
非公开发行
资源错配
定价机制
Private Equity Placement
Capital Misallocation
Pricing Mechanism