碳市场配额分配方式对厂商决策行为的影响研究

Analyse the Impact of the Carbon Emissions Allocation Model on Firm's Strategy

本文研究永久有效及当期有效两种有效期下的碳配额分配方式对厂商决策行为的影响。通过建模,分别推导出这两类有效期下配额的净市场需求函数,并比较分析:厂商在不同有效期下的碳减排决策;厂商在一级市场和二级市场同时存在时的碳减排决策;比较溯往原则与拍卖这两种配额分配方式对激励厂商实施碳减排的效果。研究结果表明:产品的均衡价格在碳配额当期有效时的水平会高于其永久有效时的水平,且永久有效时的配额价格将高于当期有效时的配额价格。而一级市场中的配额价格通常低于二级市场中的价格,且厂商在配额免费分配制度下的产量将低于拍卖分配制度下的产量,但碳减排量则更高。

This paper examines the impact of carbon emissions allowance on production and producer's emissions policy.A theoretical model is built to derive the demand for permanent and temporary permits of emissions allowance.Thereby,analytical analysis are conducted for producers'emissions policy under different types of permits under auctionmethod or historical method.It is found that the commodity price is higher in the case of a temporary permit,but permitprice is higher in the case of a permanent permit.It is also found that the permit price is lower in the auction market,and output level is higher in the market with the auction system.However,,emissions regulation can be more effectiveunder free allocation.