市场化程度、超额在职消费与盈余管理

Marketization degree, excess perks and earning management

基于在职消费效率观与代理观相融合的视角,将企业在职消费区分为正常在职消费与超额在职消费,以2012—2015年沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为样本,分别检验了两者与盈余管理的关系。研究结果表明:超额在职消费会引发企业高管盈余管理行为;相较于非国有企业,国有企业中超额在职消费引起的盈余管理行为更为显著;市场化程度的提高能抑制高管超额在职消费所引起的盈余管理行为。

By reconciling the agent view and the efficiency view,dividing perks in enterprise into normal perks and excess perks,and by using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies of manufacturing during the period of2012-2015,we test the relationship between perks and earning management.The result shows that excess perks have positive correlation with earning management.Furthermore,compared to non-state-owned enterprises,earning management caused by excess perks is more significant in the SOE;marketization degree can restrain earning management caused by excess perks to some degree.