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移动对等网络中讨价还价动态博弈的激励策略 被引量:2

Incentive Strategy in Mobile P2P Network Based on Dynamic Game of Bargaining
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摘要 内容由于移动对等网络的自组织、开放性以及节点资源受限等特点,一些节点表现出其自私性或恶意性。针对该问题,给出了一种基于讨价还价动态博弈的节点激励策略DGBIS(incentive strategy based on dynamic game of bargaining in mobile P2P network)。该激励策略采用虚拟货币的支付方式,节点先根据其拥有的虚拟货币量、自身资源状态和消息属性对每次消息转发进行估价,然后交易双方基于估价通过三次讨价还价动态博弈以合理的报价进行交易。通过博弈分析给出了DGBIS策略的纳什均衡解,使理性的自私节点为最大化其自身利益而积极参与消息转发合作,同时能抑制恶意节点的虚假报价。分析与实验结果表明,该激励策略能提高整个系统的消息转发成功率,降低系统的能量消耗,达到了预期的设计目标。 Owing to the self-organization and opening features of mobile P2P network and the resource-constraint of nodes in it,some nodes show their selfishness and malice.Aiming at this problem,this paper proposes a novel incentive strategy based on dynamic game of bargaining in mobile P2P network(DGBIS).The incentive strategy adopts virtual currency payment method.The node calculates the evaluation of a message forwarding based on the virtual currency,its resource state and the message property.Both sides of the transaction give the reasonable price according to the evaluation and based on the dynamic game of tri-stages bargaining.Through the game analysis,this paper gives the Nash equilibrium solution of DGBIS strategy,which encourages rational selfish node to cooperate with the message forwarding in order to maximize its own benefits,and holds back the deceptive price of the malicious nodes.Analysis and simulation show that this incentive mechanism is able to effectively improve the success rate of message forwarding,reduce the system??s energy consumption in the whole network system,and reach the predetermined design target.
作者 刘浩 陈志刚 张连明 LIU Hao;CHEN Zhigang;ZHANG Lianming(Institute of Information, Hunan University of Humanities, Science and Technology, Loudi, Hunan 417000, China;School of Information Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China;College of Physics and Information Science, Hunan Normal University, Changsha 410081, China)
出处 《计算机科学与探索》 CSCD 北大核心 2017年第8期1269-1278,共10页 Journal of Frontiers of Computer Science and Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金Nos.61572191 61571188 湖南省自然科学基金No.2017JJ2124 湖南省计算机应用技术重点建设学科资助项目~~
关键词 移动对等网络 自私性 恶意性 讨价还价 虚拟货币 动态博弈 激励策略 mobile P2P network selfishness malice bargaining virtual currency dynamic game incentive strategy
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